Goa
was originally a Portuguese colony after the British left India. The
Portuguese refused to give up their colonies in-spite of repeated
requests of India. The struggle was two fold. From within Goa and from
the Indian Government outside Goa.
Even
though the Portuguese assumed that India had renounced the use of force,
both the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru as well as the defense
minister, Krishna Menon made it clear that India would not fail to
resort to force as an option, if all diplomatic efforts to make the
Portuguese give up Goa fail.
THE
BUILD UP
After
years of Negotiation, in late 1961, The government decided to deploy the
armed forces in an effort to evict the Portuguese out of Goa and other
Enclaves. Accordingly in November 1961, India made preparations for the
same. Lt. Gen. Chaudhari of the Southern Army deputed 17 Infantry
Division under Major General K.P. Candeth along with the 50th Para
Brigade. To carry out the occupation of Daman, one infantry battalion -
1st Maratha LI - was assigned. Two battalions, 20th Rajput and 4th
Madras, were assigned the task of taking over Diu.
The
Portuguese were suspected to have some supersonic interceptors
initially. Later it was believed that though fighters were not based,
they maintained a regular supply chain by air. Facing this modest and
insignificant air threat was amassed a huge Indian Air Force detachment.
India had by that time six Hunter squadrons and four Canberra squadrons
as its latest additions to the Air Force.
The
Indian Air Force was requested to provide support elements to this
massive ground force. The AOC-in-C of the Western Air Command, Air Vice
Marshal Erlic Pinto, was appointed theater commander of all air forces
in the Goan Operations.
Pinto
had his HQs in Poona, Looking after all the operations in Daman, Diu and
Goa. One Tactical Air Center, the No.2 TAC, was allocated to the Goa
Sector. This TAC under Air Commodore Shivdev Singh conducted operations
in conjunction with HQ 17 Division. Operations in Daman were to be the
responsibility of No.2 Wing and Diu was directly under the Armament
Training Wing at Jamnagar.
The
main staging airbases were Poona and Sambre. Poona hosted two Canberra
Squadrons No.16 and No.35 along with a Hunter force from No.17 and No.37
Squadrons.
It
was at Sambre that most of the air component concentrated in. Sambre was
initially raised to fulfill the requirement of a Forward Base from which
support could be extended to Goa. No.45 Squadron had their main
detachment of 8 aircraft based there. No.17 had one detachment of
Hunters for air defence. And Harvards, Otters and Mi-4 helicopters
formed the communication and command duties.
GOA
OPERATIONS
The
build up to the operations started on 2 December 1961. Probing flights
by some fighters and bombers were carried out on December 8th and 9th to
lure and draw out any Portuguese air opposition that may have been
there. A Vampire, from No.108 Squadron, flew a PR Mission over some
strategic targets without encountering opposition. These baiting
missions were flown right up to D-Day, trying to draw out the Portuguese
Air Force, but to no avail.
Then
on D-Day 18 December, the Army Chief had sent a directive for the air
force to take out specific targets. Namely:
1.
Dabolim airfield to be made unusable but
at the same time ensure the terminals & facilities are not damaged.
2.
The Wireless Station at Bambolim to be knocked out.
3.
Close support to the land forces.
4.
Denial of use of Diu and Daman airfields. However, these airfields
are not to be attacked without Prior approval.
The
first use of air power occurred on December 18th. No.35 Squadron sent in
a massive wave of 12 Canberras led by the CO, Wg. Cdr. N.B. Menon to
attack Dabolim. The Canberras dropped 63,000 lbs. of bombs within
minutes, on the runway. The Canberra pilots took care not to bomb the
Terminals and the ATC. Menon noticed the presence of two large transport
aircraft in the dispersal area. One Super Constellation and one DC-6
aircraft were parked on the apron. However the Canberras left the
aircraft alone.
A
second raid by eight Canberras of No.16 Squadron led by Wg. Cdr.
Surinder Singh dropped more bombs on the runway area. The Portuguese
aircraft were again left untouched. By this time, it was assumed that
the airfield was rendered unserviceable and these aircraft can be
captured intact as they had no where to go. However the Portuguese
pilots of these aircraft proved to be both foolhardy but brave. During
nightfall, they managed to take off the aircraft from the still damaged
airfield and made their getaway to Portugal.
Meanwhile
six Hunters of No.17 Sqn led by the CO, Sqn. Ldr. Jayawant Singh took
off from Sambre and attacked the Wireless station at Bambolim. Attacking
with a mixture of rockets and gun cannon ammunition, the station was
soon left a smoldering wreck.
The
Army requested close support now and then. And usually Vampires of No.45
flew Cabrank over the sector to respond to any call for the support.
However Two Vampires of No.45 made a mistake when called by troops of
the 50th Para Brigade. They fired rockets into the positions
of the 2 Sikh LI Bn injuring two.
The
Sikhs on the other hand got their own back and fired at an Unmarked
Harvard flying from Sambre putting a couple of holes into the aircraft.
These were the only two untoward incidents in the sector.
Shortly
before the surrender on the 19th, the Liberators of No.6 Sqn flew over
Marmagao in a leaflet-dropping mission. Heralding the surrender of the
Portuguese in this Sector.
Daman
sector saw about 14 Sorties by Mysteres of No.1 Squadron flying from
Santa Cruz. Flying in pairs of two, the Mysteres harassed Portuguese gun
positions continuously throughout the day. The major air effort of the
Goa Operations were directed at the smaller enclave of Diu. At the
southern tip of the Kataiwar coast.
DIU
OPERATIONS
The
Nearest Airfield to Diu was the airbase at Jamnagar where the Armament
training wing was located. ATW Jamnagar had clear instructions not to
mount offensive action against the Diu airfield without clearance from
the Advanced HQ of 20th Rajput, the battalion on the ground. However on
the morning of 18th, contact could not be established with the ground
forces and the CO, ATW decided to launch a strike against the airfield
at around 1100 hours.
Four
Toofanis armed with 1000 lbs. bombs took off from Jamnagar arriving over
the Diu airfield in minutes. The leader of the Toofanis, noticed some
white flags being waved from the area surrounding the airfield which he
assumed as a sign of surrender. Added to the confusion was a garbled
message received by the Toofani flight about, "the airfield is in
our hands". Assuming the surrender had already taken place, the
flight leader took the Toofanis over to the sea and jettisoned their
bombs into the sea! It was only after returning to the base that they
found out that no surrender took place. The white flags noticed near the
airfield were actually Dhobies washings hung out in the open to dry!
Two
Toofanis took off again at 1400 hours and bombed the intersection of the
runways at Diu. Another four Toofanis followed up later on rocketing the
control tower, wireless station and the meteorological station.
Meanwhile
Poona had planned for a massive strike by two waves of 8 Canberras each
to bomb the Diu airfield. But the proximity of ground troops near the
airfield prevented the deployment and the raid was called off.
Around
the same time, four Vampires flying from Jamnagar over the sea near Diu,
noticed a Fast Patrol Boat traveling out of the Diu harbour. Upon closer
observation, the Vampires were fired at by the Boat. Fg. Off. P.M.
Ramachandran - the lead pilot - immediately engaged with gunfire and
rockets and sank the patrol boat. For this feat he received the Shaurya
Chakra.
Diu
received the maximum air effort of all the three theatres during the Goa
operations. With nearly 67 sorties being flown by aircraft from Jamnagar
and elsewhere. All expenditure of ammunition ceased by the end of the
second day, the surrender had all but taken place formally.
EPILOGUE
Portuguese
Governer, Manuel Anonia Vassalo De Silva, signed the surrender document
on December 19th and 3306 Portugese troops of European origin laid down
their arms. They were repatriated to Portugal after a few months.
The
Goa operations gave the IAF an opportunity to employ jet air power for
the first time on a massive scale. However that the Portuguese did not
have any AA defences nor aircraft to defend their positions. This robbed
the IAF of a realistic battlefield scenario. It was not until 1965 that
the combat potential of the air force was actually put to test.